Dialogue on Education, Science and Development in Africa: Proceedings of the 2022 International Conference of the Association for the Promotion of African Studies.

Dialogue on Religion, Theology and Development in Africa: Proceedings of the 2022 International Conference of the Association for the Promotion of African Studies.

Focuses on the relationship between Igwebuike philosophy and the advancing of girl-child education.

Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference of the Association for the Promotion of African Studies (APAS) held at the University of Nigeria Nsukka on 24th - 27th May.

Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference of the Association for the Promotion of African Studies (APAS) held at the University of Nigeria Nsukka on 24th - 27th May.

Dialogue on African Philosophy and Development: Proceedings of the 2022 International Conference of the Association for the Promotion of African Studies.

Dialogue on African Religion, Culture and Development: Proceedings of the 2022 International Conference of the Association for the Promotion of African Studies.

Dialogue on Society and Development in Africa: Proceedings of the 2022 International Conference of the Association for the Promotion of African Studies.

Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference of the Association for the Promotion of African Studies (APAS) held at the University of Nigeria Nsukka on 24th - 27th May -/- .

Proceedings of the 2023 International Conference of the Association for the Promotion of African Studies.

Contrary to the opinion of some scholars which holds that science is independent of particular worldviews in its presuppositions and method, this paper argues that although the presuppositions of science have no worldview content, science may provide evidence that has a bearing on a certain worldview . This dependence on a worldview is what gives science some level of political autonomy ; that is, some kind of scientific citizenship in philosophy that gives credence to a form of local knowledge , (...) and thus, gives voice to a group of people. This is very important as science and technology is not just about doing or making by hand ; it involves not only human activities, but also the skills of the crafts- man or woman, which does not leave out the ar t of the human mind that does the manufacturing. It is on this basis that this paper studies Igwebuike as the basis for science and technology in Africa. Igwebuike falls within the parameters of the art of the African mind. It shapes the African thinking a s it is the basis of the African logic. At this point, science and technology become a revelation of the Igwebuike framework. This piece, therefore, studied how Igwebuike impacts on science and technology through its determination of the logic (nka) employ ed in science and technology. It discovered that the African worldview conceptualized in Igwebuike is capable of a science that is anchored on the structure of the African world. For the purpose of this study, the Igwebuike complementary method of inquiry was employed. (shrink)

Right from traditional African philosophy, down to its modern and contemporary era, there has been a strong link between African philos ophy and language, underlined by the principle of complementarity. This is not disconnec ted with Placid Tempels’ employment of force to explain being, and Alexis Kagame’s NTU, as the underlying principle of reality. Pantaleon Iroegbu explained being as belon gingness. In the thoughts of Innocent Asouzu, Ibuanyidanda, was used to explain the compl ementary nature of reality. In the face (...) of ever growing complexities, African philosop hers have continued to employ African categories for the search for solutions to African problems. At a time like ours when many African governments have failed in national develop ment, especially in their ability to improve the social welfare of her people through th e provision of social amenities like quality education, portable water, transportation, good roads, good medical amenities, security of lives and property, basic infrastructur e, etc., this work employs Igwebuike philosophy, another African category, as a framewor k for Africa’s development. It develops a model of development which is inclusive and wholistic, and traces Africa’s problem of underdevelopment to the employment of no n-inclusive political and economic institutions. For the purpose of this research, the hermeneutic and Wholistic indigenous method of inquiry was employed. (shrink)

The questions that have been looming at the thoughts of many African theologians for years have been: How can the Christian faith be made to be at home in Africa, in such a way that it harmo nizes with African beliefs and practices, thus becoming the religion of the African people? What is the relationship between African traditional religion and culture with the Christian faith? Does being a Christian mean that I should distance myself from m y traditional religious and (...) cultural heritages? It is from this background that Igwebuike theology emerges as an African theology , posting that effort towards evangelization must begin from the understanding of the African worldview and the incorporation of such in the processes of the communication and learning of the Christian faith. This work presented the theology of African typo logy ( u di, meaning type, kind or nature) within the context of Igwebuike theology , with a view to creating a balance in the midst of the conflicts between Christianity and African religion and culture by connecting the events of the New Testament to events and persons in African traditional religion and culture. This connection is such that the events, persons, realities, etc., in African traditional religion and culture find meaning and fulfillment in the New Testament Scriptures. The Igwebuike theology of u di has created an aperture for further dialogue of culture with faith. It provided a deeper meaning and wider capacity for the application of the concept , ‘typology’. It has contributed to the continuous search for better ways of making the Christian fai th feel at home in Africa, and also making it possible for the redemption of the African culture through its interaction with faith. For the purpose of this study, the Igwebuike theoretical framework , which emphasizes beginning from and valuing what is kno wn, and using what is already known as a stepping stone to get to the unknown , was adopted. (shrink)

This work is a response to the questions within African philosophy and African traditional religion: the question of the underlying principle in both fields of study. It is a contribution to the ongoing investigations in the areas of African philosophy and African traditional religion in search for the keys to the understanding of both fields. This piece argued , contrary to the positions of Mbiti and Koech, that the key to understanding African traditional religion is Igwebuike. It also argued , (...) in relation to African philosophy , that Igwebuike is the in tricate web of African philosophy . It has remained constant in the midst of the changes in the history of African philosophy, and has continued to persist through changes. It argued that its sense of harmony, community, complementarity and solidarity have been expressed in virtually all the perspectives of African philosophers , from the time of Tempels to the contemporary era. This position was based on the fact that Igwebuike is based on or captures the African worldview which shapes African philosophy an d religion. The method inquiry employed for the purpose of this investigation is the Igwebuike approach, which understands reality within the parameters of complementarity. (shrink)

The questions that have been looming at the thoughts of many African theologians for years have been: How can the Christian faith be made to be at home in Africa, in such a way that it harmo nizes with African beliefs and practices, thus becoming the religion of the African people? What is the relationship between African traditional religion and culture with the Christian faith? Does being a Christian mean that I should distance myself from m y traditional religious and (...) cultural heritages? It is from this background that Igwebuike theology emerges as an African theology , posting that effort towards evangelization must begin from the understanding of the African worldview and the incorporation of such in the processes of the communication and learning of the Christian faith. This work presented the theology of African typo logy ( u di, meaning type, kind or nature) within the context of Igwebuike theology , with a view to creating a balance in the midst of the conflicts between Christianity and African religion and culture by connecting the events of the New Testament to events and persons in African traditional religion and culture. This connection is such that the events, persons, realities, etc., in African traditional religion and culture find meaning and fulfillment in the New Testament Scriptures. The Igwebuike theology of u di has created an aperture for further dialogue of culture with faith. It provided a deeper meaning and wider capacity for the application of the concept , ‘typology’. It has contributed to the continuous search for better ways of making the Christian fai th feel at home in Africa, and also making it possible for the redemption of the African culture through its interaction with faith. For the purpose of this study, the Igwebuike theoretical framework , which emphasizes beginning from and valuing what is kno wn, and using what is already known as a stepping stone to get to the unknown , was adopted. (shrink)

African Religion and Culture: Honoring the Past and Shaping the Future.

Human beings are by nature enshrined in an inescapable world - hood web called language. As a symbolic construction and human agenda setting in semantic space, language ensures the application of social meaning, control, culture and social knowledge. As a re sult of the place that language occupies in the integration, interpretation and internalization of convention for the state of affairs of sociality, it is not surprising that it has always been an attractive area and a fascinating topic for philosophers. (...) T he history of philosophical thinking about language is almost impossible to separate from the history of logic and indeed the entire history of philosophy. This piece argued that human beings do not live in the world without the agency of language which be comes the medium of expression within particular societies. It is based on this understanding (that the real world of a people is based on their language habits) that this paper employed Igwebuike as an ontological toolbox that forms the trajectory system of the Igbo - African world. Within the context of Igbo - African philosophy of language, this piece argued for the necessity of the use of the word “Igwebuike” as it captures and communicates the Igbo - African world. Igwebuike is the form (and symbolic) of the Igbo - African mental being, and thus, the gateway to Igbo - African philosophy. Beyond the literal understanding of Igwebuike (Igwe - number; bu - is; ike - strength) as ‘there is strength in number’, it captures the Igbo philosophy of relationality, complementar ity and interconnectedness of reality. The objective of this work is to discover the centrality of language within philosophy and thus give correct bearing to philosophy. For the purpose of this piece, the Igwebuike holistic approach will be employed. (shrink)

The concept of substance varies with various philosophers, depending on the school of thought to which they belong. While the materialists would develop a materialistic concept of substance, the idealist would definitely develop a spiritual or idealistic concept of substance. For the thorough going empiricist, since substance is not something that can be seen or touched, one would expect that he would deny the existence of such a thing. The researcher in this piece studies the concept of substance in the (...) different epochs in the history of philosophy: the ancient, medieval, modern and contemporary times, this is not without defining the concept of substance. Very significant in this study is the African concept of substance. Issues in metaphysics have often been treated as Western issues; the researcher however investigates the African concepts of substance to point out the contribution of Africa to the development of metaphysics and philosophy as a whole. -/- . (shrink)

Trends and advances in Education and Management in Africa.

The area of operative metaphysics speaks of a metaphysical system that does not just exist as an ivory tower apart from people’s experience, but one that could be applied to a concrete historical circumstance. This piece studies the concept of being as understood by Pantaleon Iroegbu, as being qua belongingness. The concept of being qua belongingness lies within the parameters of operative metaphysics. Pantaleon’s concept of being is analysed alongside the situation of crisis in the Niger Delta region, which the (...) researcher believes was born out of the feeling of neglect and marginalization. Placed alongside Pantaleon’s philosophy of belongingness which opines that to be is to belong, this piece proposes that if the Niger Delta people are given a sense of belongingness, the crisis in the region would come under a more genuine control. (shrink)

The consequences of Igwebuike Philosophy for the understanding of Being in African Ontology.

This paper has studied the dimensions of Igwebuike. As a unifying concept of African thought, especially, Igwebuike is understood as that aspect concerning the human person’s conception of the spiritual and material universe in which they live. It is an explanatory theory or principle that interprets the puzzle of our complex relationship with the non-corporal world and human social life, that is, the major social institutions that ensure social continuity and group identity, and further underpins the epistemological manifestations of the (...) human person’s universe. This piece has studied the dimensions of Igwebuike, which include its place within the theater of being, and its literal and linguistic meanings. It also focused on the anthropological and epistemological foundations of Igwebuike, and also its ontological and cosmological foundations. This work, although it has studied the linguistic and literal senses of Igwebuike, goes further by focusing on the philosophical dimension of the concept. The method of inquiry employed for the purpose of this research is the Igwebuike complementary approach. (shrink)

African Ideologies and Socio-Political Issues: Innovative Trends and Advances.

This work is a search for the basis of intersubjectivity in the African worldview conceptualized in Igwebuike philosophy. This piece found the basis of intersubjectivity of the African reality in Chi, which carries a variety of meanings among the Igbo - Afri can people. However, the nuance of Chi that is employed here is that which understands it as the divinity in every human person or the spark of the divine in created things. It understands Chi as the thumb print (...) or mark of Chukwu in each and every one of u s that places the other in a special place in relation to the self. This piece revealed that although Chi is a religious reality, it is conservative of the social institutions of the Igbo - African people. If I and the other have the thumb print of the same Chukwu, the spark of the Supreme Being, it then means that we relate in a special way that goes deeper than our individualities. This work, therefore, argued that our rootedness in Chukwu through Chi is what makes the other a part of me. To treat the other in a way that is undeserving of the divine mark in him or her not only affects the person(s), but the ontological structure to which I also belong and, thus, myself. The importance of Chi in this study is that the belief in Chi is as universal to the Igbo - speaking people as the belief in Chukwu, and it is a fundamental and outstanding characteristic of Igbo social structure and collective temperament. For the purpose of this study, the Igwebuike holistic approach of inquiry was adopted. Chi provides a cent ral and satisfying framework for the understanding of the interrelatedness and individuality of the Igbo - African reality. (shrink)

Bare plural generic sentences pervade ordinary talk. And yet it is extremely controversial what semantics to assign to such sentences. In this paper, I achieve two tasks. First, I develop a novel classification of the various standard uses to which bare plurals may be put. This “variety data” is important—it gives rise to much of the difficulty in systematically theorizing about bare plurals. Second, I develop a novel account of bare plurals, the radical account. On this account, all bare plurals (...) fail to express propositions. The content of a bare plural has to be pragmatically “completed” by a speaker in order for her to make an assertion. At least the content of a quantifier expression has to be supplied. But sometimes, the content of a sentential operator or modal verb is also supplied. The radical account straightforwardly explains the variety data: Speakers’ communicative intentions vary wildly across different contexts. (shrink)

Empathy is a topic of continuous debate in the nursing literature. Many argue that empathy is indispensable to effective nursing practice. Yet others argue that nurses should rather rely on sympathy, compassion, or consolation. However, a more troubling disagreement underlies these debates: There’s no consensus on how to define empathy. This lack of consensus is the primary obstacle to a constructive debate over the role and import of empathy in nursing practice. The solution to this problem seems obvious: Nurses need (...) to reach a consensus on the meaning and definition of empathy. But this is easier said than done. Concept analyses, for instance, reveal a profound ambiguity and heterogeneity of the concept of empathy across the nursing literature. Since the term “empathy” is used to refer to a range of perceptual, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral phenomena, the presence of a conceptual ambiguity and heterogeneity is hardly surprising. Our proposal is simple. To move forward, we need to return to the basics. We should develop the concept from the ground up. That is, we should begin by identifying and describing the most fundamental form of empathic experience. Once we identify the most fundamental form of empathy, we will be able to distinguish among the more derivative experiences and behaviors that are addressed by the same name and, ideally, determine the place of these phenomena in the field of nursing. The aim of this article is, consequently, to lay the groundwork for a more coherent concept of empathy and thereby for a more fruitful debate over the role of empathy in nursing. In Part 1, we outline the history of the concept of empathy within nursing, explain why nurses are sometimes warry of adapting concepts from other disciplines, and argue that nurses should distinguish between adapting concepts from applied disciplines and from more theoretical disciplines. In Part 2, we show that the distinction between emotional and cognitive empathy—borrowed from theoretical psychology—has been a major factor in nurses’ negative attitudes toward emotional empathy. We argue, however, that both concepts fail to capture the most fundamental form of empathy. In Part 3, we draw on and present some of the seminal studies of empathy that can be found in the work of phenomenological philosophers including Max Scheler, Edmund Husserl, and Edith Stein. In Part 4, we outline how their understanding of empathy may facilitate current debates about empathy’s role in nursing. (shrink)

Resolving to finish reading a novel, staying true to your punk style, or dedicating your life to an artistic project: these are examples of aesthetic commitments. I develop an account of the nature of such commitments, and I argue that they are significant insofar as they help us manage the temporally extended nature of our aesthetic agency and our relationships with aesthetic objects. At the same time, focusing on aesthetic commitments can give us a better grasp on the nature of (...) aesthetic normativity; this is because, in making aesthetic commitments, we are capable of giving aesthetic concerns the weight of obligation. I argue that appealing to aesthetic commitments allows us to account for the existence of aesthetic obligations as well as their grounding. I conclude by arguing that, although the aesthetic domain is a domain of play and freedom of choice, there is nevertheless an important place in it for both aesthetic commitments and the aesthetic obligations they generate. (shrink)

Jack Spencer has recently argued for the striking thesis that, possibly, an agent is able to do the impossible—that is, perform an action that is metaphysically impossible for that person to perform. Spencer bases his argument on (Simple G), a case in which it is impossible for an agent G to perform some action but, according to Spencer, G is still intuitively able to perform that action. I reply that we would have to give up at least four action-theoretical principles (...) if we accept that G is able to do the impossible. We may be best off retaining the principles and thus rejecting Spencer's intuition that G is able to do the impossible. I then consider an argument for the claim that G is able to do the impossible that goes through the Snapshot Principle. I, however, deny that any true variant of the Snapshot Principle shows that G is able to do the impossible. Moreover, the counterexample to the Snapshot Principle that I develop also suggests that G is unable to do the impossible in (Simple G). The most natural explanation for why an agent is unable to perform some action in this counterexample extends to (Simple G). Next, I develop three error theories for why we might initially share Spencer's intuition that G is able to do the impossible in (Simple G). Finally, I consider a couple other "G-cases" of Spencer's and find them all wanting. Perhaps we are unable to do the impossible. (shrink)

If emotion is not an arbitrary compilation of fixed types of (descriptive, conceptual, conative, prescriptive) content, nor a state that can be reduced to other types of pre-existing (perceptual, cognitive, behavioral) states, then what sort of thing is it really? Tom Cochrane has proposed that emotions are valent representations of situated concerns. Valent representation is a type of mental content whose function is to detect the presence or absence of certain conditions; what makes that type of content valent is that (...) without needing the mediation of any other state, a response is triggered that is disposed to increase or decrease the presence of the condition represented. I raise doubts about the plausibility of that account in light of recent work in philosophy of biology and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

An attractive form of social stability is realized when the members of a well-ordered society give that society’s organizing principles their free and reflective endorsement. However, many political philosophers are skeptical that there is any requirement to show that their principles would engender this kind of stability. This skepticism is at the root of a number of objections to political liberalism, since arguments for political liberalism often appeal to its ability to be stable in this way. The aim of this (...) paper is to address skepticism about the stability condition by putting forward a novel defense of it. My defense builds on the claim that stable principles are necessary to secure the full autonomy of those who live under them. (shrink)

In both The Right and the Good and The Foundations of Ethics, W. D. Ross maintains that any amount of the non-instrumental value of virtue outweighs any amount of the non-instrumental value of pleasure or avoidance of pain. The chapter raises two challenges to the status that Ross accords the value of virtue relative to the value of pleasure (pain). First, it argues that Ross fails to provide a good argument for thinking that virtue is always better than pleasure and (...) that it is in any case implausible to think that any amount of virtue (or avoidance of vice) is better than the avoidance of any amount of pain or suffering. Second, it argues that the inflexibility of Ross’s value theory exhibited in his claim about the relative value of virtue produces tension with and mars the attractive heterarchical structure of his theory of rightness or prima facie duties. (shrink)

A review of Anthony Appiah's Experiments in Ethics.

A distinctive position in contemporary political philosophy is occupied by those who defend the principle of public justification. This principle states that the moral or political rules that govern our common life must be in some sense justifiable to all reasonable citizens. In this article, I evaluate Gerald Gaus’s defence of this principle, which holds that it is presupposed by our moral reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation. He argues, echoing P.F. Strawson in ‘Freedom and Resentment’, that these attitudes are (...) so deep a part of us that we are unable to rationally reject them. I examine and reject this defence of the principle. Considering the nature of our commitment to the moral reactive attitudes, I argue that those attitudes need not be grounded in a commitment to public justification. The availability of alternative grounds for these attitudes shows, contra Gaus, that we can rationally reject the principle of public justification while maintaining a wholehearted commitment to the reactive attitudes. (shrink)

We explore the role of episodic imagining in explaining why people both differentially report that it seems to them in experience as though time robustly passes, and why they differentially report that they believe that time does in fact robustly pass. We empirically investigate two hypotheses, the differential vividness hypothesis, and the mental time travel hypothesis. According to each of these, the degree to which people vividly episodically imagine past/future states of affairs influences their tendency to report that it seems (...) to them as though time robustly passes and to judge that time does robustly pass. According to the former, a greater degree of vividness will tend to increase the extent to which people make such reports, while according to the latter, it will tend to decrease the extent to which people make such reports. We found weak evidence in favour of the former hypothesis. We reflect on the implications of this finding for theorising about such reports. (shrink)

How is the Sartrean conception of phenomena of anguish connected to what we currently refer to as phenomena of anxiety? And what is the exact interrelation between anguish, fear, and anxiety?

Judgment subjectivism is the view that x is good for S if and only if, because, and to the extent that S believes, under the proper conditions, that x is good for S. In this paper, I offer three related arguments against the theory. The arguments are about what judgment subjectivism implies about the well-being of welfare nihilists, people who believe there are no welfare properties, or at least that none are instantiated. I maintain that welfare nihilists can be benefited (...) and harmed. Judgment subjectivism is implausible because it implies otherwise. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to introduce a new concept of “pain-related bodily doubt,” which complements current concepts currently in use, such as pain-related fear, pain catastrophizing, and pain self-efficacy. This new concept, adapted from recent philosophical work on illness experience, has the potential to positively contribute to pain research and clinical practice by providing a vocabulary for clinicians and patients to discuss implicit or tacit dimensions of pain-related experiences.

“On the Subject Matter of Phenomenological Psychopathology” provides a framework for the phenomenological study of mental disorders. The framework relies on a distinction between (ontological) existentials and (ontic) modes. Existentials are the categorial structures of human existence, such as intentionality, temporality, selfhood, and affective situatedness. Modes are the particular, concrete phenomena that belong to these categorial structures, with each existential having its own set of modes. In the first section, we articulate this distinction by drawing primarily on the work of (...) Martin Heidegger—especially his study of the ontological structure of affective situatedness (Befindlichkeit) and its particular, ontic modes, which he calls moods (Stimmungen). In the second section, we draw on a study of grief to demonstrate how this framework can be used when conducting phenomenological interviews and analyses. In the concluding section, we explain how this framework can be guide phenomenological studies across a broad range of existential structures. (shrink)

The aesthetic domain is a social one. We coordinate our individual acts of creation, appreciation, and performance with those of others in the context of social aesthetic practices. More strongly, many of the richest goods of our aesthetic lives are constitutively social; their value lies in the fact that individuals are engaged in joint aesthetic agency, participating in cooperative and collaborative project that outstrips what can be realized alone. I provide an account of nature and value of two such social (...) aesthetic goods—aesthetic communities and aesthetic traditions—and further argue that such goods are a core constituent of an aesthetically good life. At the same time, I argue that the ideals of the dominant theory of aesthetic value, aesthetic value hedonism, are incompatible with a full commitment to these social aesthetic goods; the hedonist is thereby alienated from the other participants within aesthetic communities and traditions. This sets up a dilemma for the hedonist: either the hedonist must bite the bullet, accepting that the theory leads to a problematic form of aesthetic alienation; or, we must reject aesthetic value hedonism and adopt a different theory of aesthetic value which accommodates the value of social aesthetic goods. I argue that we should take the second horn of the dilemma. (shrink)

Musing for Puncta special issue "Critically Sick: New Phenomenologies Of Illness, Madness, And Disability.".

This paper discusses two approaches to climate ethics for practicalreflection and decision-making in concrete local climate changegovernance. After a brief review of the main conceptual frameworksin climate ethics research, we show that none of these leadingapproaches is sufficiently context specific and pluralistic to provideguidance appropriate for concrete local climate governance. Asalternatives, we present principlism as a methodology of midlevelprinciples and environmental pragmatism as an ethicalapproach. We argue that the two methodologies of principlismand pragmatism offer a new pluralistic framework that allows (...) realworldconditions and contexts to be properly integrated into ethicalanalysis and decision-making in climate governance. (shrink)

Recently, there have been calls to develop a more contextual approach to phenomenological psychopathology—an approach that attends to the socio-cultural as well as personal and biographical factors that shape experiences of mental illness. In this Perspective article, we argue that to develop this contextual approach, phenomenological psychopathology should adopt a new paradigm case. For decades, schizophrenia has served as the paradigmatic example of a condition that can be better understood through phenomenological investigation. And recent calls for a contextual approach continue (...) to use schizophrenia as their primary example. We argue, in contrast, that substance misuse provides a better paradigm case around which to develop a contextually sensitive phenomenological psychopathology. After providing a brief vignette and analysis of a case of substance misuse, we explain why this kind of condition requires considerable sensitivity and attention to context, better motivating the incorporation and development of new contextually sensitive approaches. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that phenomenological psychopathologists, despite their critical attitude toward mainstream psychiatry, still hold problematic prejudices about the nature of psychiatric conditions as illness or disorder. I suggest that phenomenological psychopathologists turn to resources in the neurodiversity and mad pride movements to critically reflect upon these prejudices and appreciate the methodological problems that they pose.

Aims and Objectives. This article uses the concept of embodiment to demonstrate a conceptual approach to applied phenomenology. -/- Background. Traditionally, qualitative researchers and healthcare professionals have been taught phenomenological methods, such as the epoché, reduction, or bracketing. These methods are typically construed as a way of avoiding biases so that one may attend to the phenomena in an open and unprejudiced way. However, it has also been argued that qualitative researchers and healthcare professionals can benefit from phenomenology’s well-articulated theoretical (...) framework, which consists of core concepts, such as selfhood, empathy, temporality, spatiality, affectivity, and embodiment. -/- Design. This is a discursive article that demonstrates a conceptual approach to applied phenomenology. -/- Method. To outline and explain this approach to applied phenomenology, the Discussion section walks the reader through four stages of phenomenology, which progress incrementally from the most theoretical to the most practical. -/- Discussion. Part one introduces the philosophical concept of embodiment, which can be applied broadly to any human subject. Part two shows how philosophically trained phenomenologists use the concept of embodiment to describe general features of illness and disability. Part three illustrates how the phenomenological concept of embodiment can inform empirical qualitative studies and reflects on the challenges of integrating philosophy and qualitative research. Part four turns to phenomenology’s application in clinical practice and outlines a workshop model that guides clinicians through the process of using phenomenological concepts to better understand patient experience. -/- Conclusion and Relevance to Clinical Practice. A conceptual approach to applied phenomenology provides a valuable alternative to traditional methodological approaches. Phenomenological concepts provide a foundation for better understanding patient experience in both qualitative health research and clinical practice, and therefore provide resources for enhancing patient care. (shrink)

Digital technology has prompted philosophers to rethink some of the fundamental categories we use to make sense of the world and ourselves. Particularly, the concept of ‘identity’ and its reconfiguration in the digital age has sparked much debate in this regard. While many studies have addressed the impact of the digital on personal and social identities, the concept of ‘collective identity’ has been remarkably absent in such inquiries. In this article, I take the context of social movements as an entry (...) point to discuss the reconfiguration of collective identity in social media environments. I do so by introducing a narrative approach to collective identity. I argue that Twitter’s affordances invite new ways of constructing collective identities and imply a shifting relationship between the individual and the collective. (shrink)